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No Vehicles in the Park
Pierre Schlag*
In 1958 H.L.A. Hart posed a hypothetical. Here it is:
A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park.
Plainly this forbids an automobile, but what about bicycles, rol-
ler skates, toy automobiles? What about airplanes? Are these,
as we say, to be called "vehicles" for the purpose of the rule or
not?'
Over the years, this has become a nearly irresistible hypothetical.
Generations of Anglo-American legal thinkers have cut their interpre-
tive teeth on this hypothetical-striving to advance or defend all sorts
of insights about law, interpretation, and adjudication.
You can easily imagine how this might happen. It builds on it-
self. There are the myriad factual variations on the hypothetical. Hart
thought that an automobile was plainly covered.2 In a reply to Hart,
Lon Fuller asked him about a World War II military truck set on a
pedestal as a memorial.' Is that a vehicle?4 O.K., then what about an
ambulance?5  A stroller?6  A wheel chair? A... and so on and so
forth.
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1. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
607 (1958).
2. See id.
3. Lon Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law---A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630, 663 (1958).
4. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 526 (1988) ("The 'no vehicles in
the park' rule clearly points to the exclusion of the statue."). Accord J.E. Penner, The 'Bundle of
Rights' Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 790 (1996) ("[T]rucks are vehicles.").
5. See Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 79
(1998) ("[W]e know perfectly well that ambulances, for example, are vehicles."); Jeremy Wal-
dron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL. L. REV. 509, 537
(1994) ("An ambulance is not a borderline case of a vehicle; if anything it is a paradigm case of
vehicle.").
6. See Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Contemporary Assault on Checks and Balances, 7 WID-
ENER J. PUBLIC L. 231, 251 (1998) ("Surely in this context a baby carriage would not be a
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These hypothetical vehicles were all sent out on various mis-
sions-namely, to support or wreck some preferred interpretive strat-
egy (of which there was no shortage):
The Plain Meaning of the Text: A vehicle is a vehicle is a vehi-
cle.7
Policy Analysis: The meaning of the term "vehicle" depends
upon the plausible purposes of the ordinance.'
Framers' Intent: The meaning of the term depends upon what
the framers of the ordinance intended.9
Cultural Contextualism: The meaning of the term "vehicle" ul-
timately depends on shared cultural understandings; for
instance, on the nature of the park (e.g., rest, relaxation, amuse-
ment).10
Clintonian Parsing: A vehicle is what I say it is.
Additional interpretive approaches could be included here. And
a number of adjudicatory considerations, such as certainty, predict-
ability, and prudence, could be added to each of the interpretive
strategies.
The debates that have followed in the wake of the hypothetical
have been excruciatingly intricate, involving numerous distinctions
and multiple acts of analytical subdivision.1" These debates need not
be repeated here. I mention them only to show that an abundance of
plausible interpretive techniques and adjudicatory considerations can
be brought to bear upon the interpretation of the ordinance. It is
likely that these techniques and considerations might in some cases
produce different results.
So now here's the question I would like to pose. It's a question
that we might expect a judge to pose: What does the ordinance really
mean? And, of course, we would expect a judge to ask such a question
prohibited vehicle.").
7. Certainly at the core. See Hart, supra note 1.
8. See Fuller, supra note 3, at 662-63.
9. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 535-36 (1947).
10. See, e.g., Steven Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69
TEXAS L. REV. 1881, 1885-1905 (1991); Marc R. Poirier, On Whose Authority?: Linguists'
Claim of Expertise to Interpret Statutes, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1025, 1040 (1995).
11. As an example, see the dialogue among linguists and law teachers in the Proceedings of
the Northwestern University/Washington University Law and Linguistic Conference, 73 WASH. U.
L.Q. 800, 839-74 (1995).
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in the context of a specific law 2 and a specific factual situation. So the
judge would very likely ask something like: "Does the ordinance, or
the term 'vehicle,' cover, reach, include, apply to an ambulance, a
motorized toy boat, a . . (and so on)?"
Maybe you don't care a whole lot about this kind of question.
There are good reasons not to care-not too many people do. 3 But,
for the time being, try to care. Pretend that you really do want to
know what the rule really means. You want to know this as much as
you want to know anything.
Trying to find out what the ordinance really means requires
something that I will call "interpretation as retrieval." 4 By this
phrase, "interpretation as retrieval," I mean nothing terribly fancy.
Interpretation as retrieval is the attempt to retrieve the meaning of an
artifact or text-a meaning that is found in the artifact or text and that
you, the interpreter, do not already have. I am not saying that inter-
pretation as retrieval is easy (quite the contrary).
To illustrate the difficulties of interpretation as retrieval, con-
sider the movie "Basic Instinct."1 5 This suspense movie begins as the
12. The Municipal Code of the City of Seattle addresses this matter. There is a general
provision that prohibits vehicles in the park:
It is unlawful to drive or ride in or on any motor vehicle or animal, other than a city-
owned service or emergency vehicle... in any park when the park is not open to the
public, or when the park, roadway, or parking lot is, by order of the Superintendent,
closed to entry or use by motor vehicles, except on a street serving as necessary access
through such park to a residential or commercial area.
SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 18.12.235 (1997). Interestingly, the Seattle City Council has sought to
resolve some of the variations on Hart's hypothetical:
It is unlawful to operate any motorized model aircraft or motorized model watercraft
in any park except at places set apart by the Superintendent for such purposes or as
authorized by a permit from the Superintendent.
SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 18.12.265 (1997).
13. In fact, outside the precincts of the legal academy, it is hard to find anybody who cares
much about the meaning of an ordinance that reads "No vehicles in the park." Trust me. I
looked. I checked LEXIS. Jane Thompson, a law librarian at the University of Colorado, did
find a reported case in Shepard's Ordinance Law Annotations (a comprehensive digest of Ameri-
can cases that interpret or apply city and county ordinances). The case pertained to the consti-
tutionality of a St. Louis municipal ordinance prohibiting motorcycles in the park. The
American Motorcycle Association brought suit for injunctive relief claiming the ordinance vio-
lated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The Association argued
that strict scrutiny applied because the ordinance violated the fundamental rights of free speech
and assembly. (The argument was rejected.) See American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. City of St.
Louis, 622 S.W.2d 267 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
So, apparently, the American Motorcyclist Association cared. But let's face it-you probably
don't. Why not? Simple. There doesn't seem to be much at stake. That will often, though not
invariably, be true.
14. See generally Pierre Schlag, Authorizing Interpretation, 30 U. CONN. L. REV. 1065,
1071 (1998).
15. BASIC INSTINCT (TriStar Pictures 1992).
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police arrive at a murder scene. A rock star has been killed. Amidst
an absence of knowledge, the one thing that is known (almost for sure)
is that the murderer used a sharp instrument like an ice pick. The
detective, played by Michael Douglas, investigates two female sus-
pects, one played by Sharon Stone and the other played by Jeanne
Tripplehorn. He becomes sexually involved with the suspect played
by Sharon Stone. By the end of the movie, in the dnouement, the
tension is broken in classic Hollywood style: it is Jeanne Tripplehorn
(not Sharon Stone) who appears to be the guilty one. And in an
equally classic display of Hollywood justice, Tripplehorn is killed.
But the movie does not end there. Instead, we get one more sexual
encounter involving Michael Douglas and Sharon Stone, who is appar-
ently no longer a suspect. The camera zooms back from the bed to
offer a wide angle. It pans down slowly from the edge of the bed, past
the bedding, past the mattress until it reaches the floor. The camera
zooms in and there it is-an ice pick.
The ice pick, the sure thing around which the characters, the
action, and the tension are all organized, is back. And so is the uncer-
tainty: Who was really the murderer? Now, as you leave the theater
you might ask, "Well, who did it?" You might even get into a heated
argument with a friend about the issue. People often do this. Evi-
dence is adduced. Arguments are advanced. Probabilities and
improbabilities are assessed. "It couldn't have been Sharon Stone
because earlier, she said that . . . " "Yeah, sure, but Tripplehorn
would also say that ... ." And so on and so forth.
You could ask some well-situated people: "Who really did the
murder?" You could try to contact the author, the director, the publi-
cist, or Sharon Stone or Michael Douglas to find out. But they won't
help. Suppose they all tell you, five people in all, face to face, "Oh
yeah, it was the Sharon Stone character who did it. Really-we know
for sure." Does this help you? At all? Suppose there are four extras,
who tell you, with what seem to be much more cogent arguments,
"No, no, those five have got it all wrong. We four really know what
happened. It was Jeanne Tripplehorn." Does any of this help?
No.16
And if the author tells you, "Look, you've missed the point. The
whole point of the movie is to leave the question ambiguous-to leave
16. Would it help if the author said, "Oh, I didn't really have any intent. Actually, I never
thought about it." Or even, "Well, my intent was to leave movie-goers and movie critics in a
quandary." Does this help? Well, it might help you give up on your question. That would not
be a bad thing, but it does not answer your question. To the extent the question remained live,
you would still need to figure out what bearing the author's testimony has on the question you
have asked.
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you in a state of uncertainty. So the one thing that is for sure is that
no one can tell you who did it."
Does any of this help? No. Why not? Because they are not
answering your question. You are not taking a poll. You are not ask-
ing to follow the best expertise. This is not a debate round: you are
not judging who has the best argument. You are not evaluating track
records for literary trustworthiness. And you probably don't even care
about the author's intent. These are at most accessory considerations.
What you want to know is, "Who really did it?"
But this question you ask, you cannot answer. You can cogently
ask about all sorts of things, including other people's opinions as to
who did it; what the author intended; what the conventions of the
genre would reveal, if anything, about who did it; and so forth. But
notice two things. First, these are not the same questions as the one
you want answered: "Who really did it?" And second, you can't have
the answer to this last question. And that's because there is none. It's
a movie.
Now, this is somewhat frustrating. You've just sat through one-
hundred twenty-three minutes of a suspense movie. And in the last
scene, there is finally the last piece of the puzzle, an ice pick, plain as
day, evidence as sharp as can be and the damned thing is hermeneuti-
cally dysfunctional. There it is-pointing in all sorts of directions:
It was Sharon Stone who did it.
They both did it.
One of them did it, but we haven't figured out who.
At least one of them did it, but something (in the nature of her-
meneutic ambiguity, ambivalence, vagueness, incompleteness)
prevents us from figuring out who did it.
None of the usually accepted determinants of meaning are capa-
ble of forcing a conclusion-not the artifact, not author's intent,
not conventions of the genre, not expertise, and certainly not us.
There is nothing to be known about who did it.
No one did it.
Nothing was done.
1999]
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We don't know what we're asking about. 17
Now, of all these answers, the last is almost surely the most
interesting. We have been looking to figure out who really did it.
The ice pick at the end throws us into a quandary. At first this is a
simple quandary; the problem seems to be one of deciphering the
narrative meaning of an ambivalent or ambiguous sign, a piece of evi-
dence, the ice pick.
But, at some point, as the list of questions above suggests, the
quandary becomes more difficult. It becomes more difficult as we
recognize that the meaning of the ice pick does not relate simply to the
guilt or innocence of the suspects, but rather to a dizzying array of
possibilities. The ice pick is a clue, a red herring, a tease, a provoca-
tion, a fetish, a taunt, an image, a distraction, a gentle reproach, a gim-
mick, an afterthought. Its meaning registers in the frames of author
intentionality, audience desire, conventions of the genre, expectations
of the film crowd, narratives of the story, forensic folklore, narratives
within the narratives, dissonance reduction strategies ... and so on.
The problem is that what seems so straightforward, the ice pick, reso-
nates in meaning all over the place. And when we ask, "Well, what
does the ice pick really mean?" or when we ask, "Well, who really did
it?", it is not at all clear what we are asking.
Is a "vehicle" in a rule about a park like an "ice pick" in a movie
about a murder?"8
Well, yes-in some ways.
Watch. Suppose you are a judge. And suppose in that capacity
you are asking, "What does the term 'vehicle' really mean?" Now
again, you can ask what the word means to most people. (But you are
not taking a poll.) You can ask what expert linguists believe the word
means. (But you are not asking to follow the best expertise.) You can
ask who among the litigants has the best argument about what the
word means. (But you are not judging a debate round.) You can ask
the city council members what they meant by the term "vehicle."
(But they are not deities and you are not an oracle.)
You can, of course, ask these questions, and you can even get
answers. 19 But notice that these are not the same as the question you
want answered. What you want to know is what does "vehicle" mean
in the legal rule about the park. And that is not just a question of
17. "We'll find out in the sequel" is obviously not a satisfactory answer either.
18. On the fictional character of legal authority, see Steven Smith, Radically Subversive
Speech and the Authority of Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 348 (1995).
19. And what's more, the answers can even be helpful. See Lawrence M. Solan, Can the
Legal System Use Experts in Meaning?, 66 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 1999).
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polls, linguistic expertise, rhetorical acuity, or framers' intent. It is a
question about the meaning of "vehicle" in the legal rule and in the
law.
And the problem is that within the context of law, the term
"vehicle" can be as engagingly accommodating as the ice pick in the
movie. That is because, as a general word in a legal rule, the term
draws its meaning from the interweavings of all manner of webs-
webs that are often described as linguistic, cognitive, moral, political,
institutional, or cultural. In the rule, the meaning of the term "vehi-
cle" is inscribed in tacit understandings of parks; legal rules; the
effects of legal rules; the roles and possibilities of legal rules within the
hierarchies of sources of law; the "public" meaning of legal rules for
citizens and public officials; and the meaning of legal rules in light of
juridical concepts of excuse, justification, prosecutorial discretion, and
much more.2"
We are not just talking about parks and vehicles here; we are
talking about parks and vehicles in a legal rule in a legal system in a
particular culture. It is possible to say (and some commentators have)
that the term vehicle does have a hard core of settled linguistic mean-
ing and that this meaning should be honored as a matter of law. This
was Hart's argument.21 For him, an automobile was plainly a vehicle.
But this move-this claim that the term "vehicle" has a core meaning
separate from and independent of the rest of the sentence-is just
that-a legal move. And even if Hart were correct (a highly debatable
point) that there is such a core meaning, he still has to make the point
that this core meaning is or should be determinative of the meaning of
the ordinance. To put it another way, he still has to make the point
that his linguistic views (right as they may be) are or should be defini-
tive of what counts as law. And in fact he does try to make the point.
The settled core of meaning must be honored, according to Hart,
because it is a "central element" (notice the tautology) of actual law,
and he wishes to protect the integrity of this central element from the
influence of policy analysis." Hart's brief for the protection of the
hard core of settled meaning is not informed by linguistic scruple, but
by his wish to preserve the hard core of settled meaning from the
effects of reconsideration in light of social policy.
Hart's legal move is a possible move, but it is just that-a legal
move. And the move that Lon Fuller made in response to Hart-the
effort to reintegrate the term "vehicle" within the context of the rest of
20. See generally Winter, supra note 10.
21. Hart, supra note 1, at 607.
22. Id. at 615.
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the rule-is also just that-a legal move. Fuller pointed out that
Hart's atomistic approach to interpretation, the presumption that the
term "vehicle" has meaning in and of itself, would lead to nonsense.
It would lead to absurd or impossible interpretations of the rule. But,
again, this linguistic point was in the service of a legal concern. Fuller,
who favored a purposive analysis of the legal rule, attacked Hart not
simply on linguistic grounds, but rather on the grounds that Hart's
atomistic word parsing would harm a purposive "structural integrity"
(notice the tautology) of the law."
Hart, and Fuller, and everyone after argue about the meaning of
the rule or the term "vehicle" on the basis of legal moves. That is, all
of these theorists use rhetorical strategies that rest on some overt or
covert claim that their affirmation of meaning of the ordinance is itself
required or authorized by a proper understanding of what law is.
They all claim, and quite plausibly so, to get their proper under-
standing of the law from the law itself. And they all claim that the
understanding they get is the one that is right-the one that overrides
all the others.
Judges do this, too. In fact, it's more understandable that judges
should do this than legal academics. With judges, it's part of the job
description. After all, unlike legal academics, judges actually have to
decide cases and, thus, arrive at some declaration of what the law is.
Their strategy will always be reductive. They will affirm that there is
a law of law-a law that governs the law and makes the law mean just
this one thing and not the others.24
Notice what happens when you've reached this point. You now
understand that law exceeds what a judge will call law in the end. A
judge will substitute for law one of its possibilities. Moreover, he will
claim, and not wrongly, that it is law itself that authorizes him to do
this. And because law is organized in this way, a later judge will also
be able to claim, again not wrongly, that the prior judge got the law
wrong.
At first, this account might seem to imply that law is or ought to
appear disorganized, chaotic, or unsettled. But that does not follow.
The reason that law does not always (or even often) seem as vertigi-
nous, dizzy, or disarrayed as its possibilities imply is that at least one
of its possibilities is always to be reduced to just one of its possibilities.
That is what Hart did with his "core of settled meaning."
23. See Fuller, supra note 3.
24. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
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Should we call this game off? Frankly, it's not our call. And it's
likely that, for some time, judges will continue to play this game.
They have to decide cases, and it is understandable that they should
strive to ascribe their legal interpretations to something they call law.
And it is even understandable that in this endeavor they should try to
fake it (and even fake it to themselves). What is more, given the
reflexive nature of the game, it's not even clear that they are faking it.
So much for judges. What about legal academics? They are still
pursuing the game, indeed vigorously so. Recently, the effort has
been to deploy ever more powerful and intricate academic arsenals to
bear on the meaning of this little ordinance, as if intensive disciplinary
care could resolve the question or improve the answers.
It is an odd, or at least an interesting thing, that so much effort is
devoted to work out elaborate rational schemes to answer impossible
questions in cases that almost never come up and generally have no
significant stakes whatsoever. There is a jurisprudence implied in that
kind of effort. But I stop here.
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